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—  Comment  — 
“Laboratories of Democracy” or 
“Machinery of Death”? The 
Story of Lethal Injection 
Secrecy and a Call to the 
Supreme Court for Intervention 
“A popular Government, without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce, or a Tragedy; 
or, perhaps both.”1 
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Introduction 
Lethal injection is by far the most common method of capital 
punishment in the United States today. Over the course of the last 
three decades, roughly 85 percent of all executions have been by lethal 
injection.2 Many states still have other methods of execution available 
by law, but in practice only five prisoners have been executed using one 
of these alternative methods since the turn of the century.3  
In 1982, Texas became the first state to execute a prisoner by 
injecting drugs intravenously.4 While Texas has this landmark to its 
 
1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 The 
Writings of James Madison 71 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900). 
2. Kate Pickert, A Brief History of Lethal Injection, Time, Nov. 10, 2009. 
For a concise overview of the evolution of methods of capital punishment, 
from death by hanging to lethal injection, see Brief for the Fordham 
University School of Law, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) 
(No. 07-5439) [hereinafter Fordham Amicus Brief].  
3. Pickert, supra note 2.  
4. See Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 28.  
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name, Oklahoma might have made the more influential contribution to 
the current condition of capital punishment when it became the first 
state to create lethal injection protocols.5 The story of how Oklahoma 
made those first lethal injection protocols serves as a metaphor for the 
newest evolution of capital punishment protocols and the subject of this 
Comment: Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws. 
Before lethal injection, most states used electrocution as their pri-
mary means of capital punishment. Electric chairs, it turns out, are 
quite expensive.6 The Oklahoma legislature was struggling with the 
financial implications of a broken “chair” in the late 1970s when some 
legislators began to look outside the box, mulling alternative methods 
of execution that would be cheaper and, hopefully, more humane.7 Two 
men, a politician and a doctor, spearheaded the movement to find a 
way to execute prisoners by injecting deadly drugs. Assembly Member 
Bill Wiseman, the politician, first approached the state medical board 
with the idea but was rebuffed over concerns of public perception.8  
Wiseman then sought the help of Dr. Jay Chapman, the state med-
ical examiner at the time.9 Despite the fact that Chapman admitted to 
having “no experience” with creating lethal drug concoctions, Chapman 
and Wiseman sat down together one day to crank out a lethal injection 
protocol.10 Chapman’s protocol, as dictated to Wiseman, went as 
follows: “An intravenous saline drip shall be started in the prisoner’s 
arm, into which shall be introduced a lethal injection consisting of an 
ultra-short-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical 
paralytic.”11  
 
5. Id. at 15. 
6. Senator Bill Dawson estimated in 1977 that it would cost Oklahoma about 
$62,000 to fix its electric chair. See Deborah Denno, When Legislatures 
Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of 
Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 Ohio 
St. L.J. 63, 95 (2002). 
7. See id. at 95–96 (noting that the legislators were given assurances that 
lethal injection was “extremely humane” compared to the electric chair 
or gas chambers). 
8. Robbie Byrd, Informal Talks Opened Door to Lethal Injection, The 
Huntsville Item, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.itemonline.com/news/local
_news/informal-talks-opened-door-to-lethal-injection/article_c48882d1-
39b2-5613-820c-eda28193d4e0.html. 
9. Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 17–18. 
10. Human Rights Watch, So Long as They Die: Lethal Injections 
in the United States 14 (2006), http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2
006/04/23/so-long-they-die-0; see also Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 
2, at 18 (noting that Chapman and Wiseman “hastily dictated” their 
execution method). 
11. Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 18. 
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Another Oklahoma legislator, State Senator Bill Dawson, was also 
looking into the possibility of a lethal injection protocol. Dawson met 
with a friend, Dr. Stanley Deutsch, who was the head of the 
anesthesiology department at Oklahoma Medical School. In a letter 
that would influence the state legislature’s eventual bill, Dr. Deutsch 
suggested that prisoners be given a heavy dose of an anesthetic.12 Thus, 
a three-drug protocol was born: the first drug anesthetized, the second 
drug paralyzed and ceased breathing, and the third drug stopped the 
heart.13 Each drug alone would produce death in the amounts called for 
by the protocols.14 When asked why he chose to use three drugs, 
Chapman responded by saying, “You just wanted to make sure the 
prisoner was dead at the end, so why not just add a third lethal drug?”15 
Perhaps the most startling aspect of this story, the story of the 
birth of lethal injection in the United States as the modern method of 
capital punishment,16 is the utter lack of medical or scientific expertise 
supporting it. Dr. Chapman later described how he came up with the 
idea of the multiple drug protocol: “I didn’t do any research. I just 
knew from having been placed under anesthesia myself . . . what we 
needed. I wanted to have at least two drugs in doses that would each 
kill the prisoner, to make sure if one didn’t kill him, the other would.”17 
 
12. Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 2. See also Deborah W. Denno, 
The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death 
Penalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 49, 67 (2007); Fordham Amicus Brief, 
supra 2, at 19 (“Although these specific drugs apparently were considered 
and discussed with Chapman at the time, the legislators chose instead to 
propose vague statutory language, which specified neither specific drugs 
nor doses. They did so because they were uncertain how much time would 
pass before a lethal injection execution would be carried out and thus 
contemplated that drug technology might advance by that time. See id. 
In effect, the result of this decision was the delegation to Oklahoma prison 
officials of all critical decisions regarding the implementation of lethal 
injection.”) (internal citation omitted). 
13. See Pickert, supra note 2. 
14. Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 2. 
15. Id. at 15. 
16. Nazi Germany experimented with lethal injection in a large-scale euthan-
asia program. For a physician’s take on the parallels between that Nazi 
program and lethal injection in the United States, see Jonathan I. Groner, 
Lethal Injection: A Stain on the Face of Medicine, 325 Brit. Med. J. 
1026 (2002). 
17. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 15; see also Fordham 
Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 15 (“The historical evidence demonstrates 
that states adopted the nearly ubiquitous three-drug lethal injection 
protocol quickly and haphazardly. In so doing, they engrained a seemingly 
modern, scientific method of execution without conducting any relevant 
medical or scientific study or soliciting input from appropriate experts.”). 
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The three-drug protocol was an answer to the political question, 
“How can the state continue executing prisoners in the wake of 
Oklahoma’s broken electric chair?” Oklahoma and Texas then served 
as the laboratories for developing and implementing these first lethal 
injection procedures. Other states fell in line soon after the first years 
of lethal injection, usually by simply copying the procedures that 
Oklahoma and Texas had used.18 These protocols remained in place in 
most states for about three decades.19  
The old protocols are now changing in response to a new political 
impediment to lethal injection: pharmaceutical manufacturers are re-
fusing to provide states with the drugs needed to execute prisoners.20 
At its essence, the problem is lethal injection’s version of the broken 
electric chair. Just like Oklahoma’s broken electric chair in the late 
1970s, this impediment has state legislatures haphazardly throwing 
ideas at the wall to see what sticks. As Fordham law professor and 
noted death penalty scholar Deborah W. Denno puts it, “states are just 
 
18. Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 15 (“Oklahoma was the first state 
to adopt a lethal injection protocol, in 1977. Almost immediately 
thereafter, state after state—including Kentucky—uncritically copied Ok-
lahoma’s procedure.”). 
19. See Deborah Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 Geo. L.J. 
1331, 1335 (2014) (“There have been more changes in lethal injection 
protocols during the past five years than there have been in the last three 
decades.”). 
20. See Mark Berman, Ohio Drops Controversial Lethal Injection Drug, 
Postpones Upcoming Execution, Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 2015, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/01/09/ohio-drops 
-controversial-lethal-injection-drug-postpones-upcoming-execution/ 
(“[The] ongoing drug shortage . . . has caused states . . . to scramble to 
find the necessary drugs or consider alternative methods of execution.”); 
Alan Johnson, Judge Orders Temporary Moratorium on Ohio Executions, 
Columbus Dispatch, May 29, 2014, http://www.dispatch.com/ 
content/stories/local/2014/05/28/temporary-moratorium-on-lethal-inject 
ions.html (noting widespread controversy since the time “European man-
ufacturers either stopped making drugs used in executions or refused to 
sell them to U.S. distributors”); Manny Fernandez, Executions Stall as 
States Seek Different Drugs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/09/us/executions-stall-as-states 
-seek-different-drugs.html?_r=0 (“Looking for alternatives, state prison 
systems have been more eager to try new drugs, buy drugs from new 
sources, keep the identities of their drug suppliers secret and even swap 
drugs among states.”); Makiko Kitamura & Adi Narayan, Europe Pushes 
to Keep Lethal Injection Drugs from U.S. Prisons, BusinessWeek, Feb. 
7, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-02-07/europe-
pushes-to-keep-lethal-injection-drugs-from-u-dot-s-dot-prisons. 
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scrambling for drugs, and they’re changing their protocols rapidly and 
carelessly.”21 
While the new protocols vary among states and are still in their 
infancy, certain trends are emerging as states try to right the ship as 
quickly as possible. One common thread connecting nine states, all of 
which are dealing with similar problems, is the emergence of laws that 
make confidential certain information concerning the processes involved 
in creating, distributing, and administering the lethal injection drugs.22 
These laws, Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws, have generated a lot of 
criticism.23 Important to this Comment, these laws have also given rise 
to a number of constitutional challenges brought by prisoners on death 
row seeking to delay or terminate their executions.24 
At the heart of each constitutional challenge is a claim that the 
state’s secrecy law violates the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process 
Clause by depriving the challenger of information needed to show that 
the execution will be “cruel and unusual.” Reviewing courts have 
generally upheld the laws, but the majority opinions tend to leave some 
doubt about the constitutional questions.25  
 
21. Fernandez, supra note 20. Denno also notes that “[w]e have seen more 
changes in lethal injection protocols in the last five years than we have 
seen in the last three decades.” Id.  
22. These nine states are as follows: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 13-757 (2009); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 945.10 (West Supp. 2015); Ga. 
Code Ann. § 42-5-36 (West 2014); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:570 (Supp. 
2015); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 546.720 (West 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§§ 2949.221–.222 (2015); Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 85.10 (2014); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 24-3-580 (2010). Texas does not have a specific law but will not 
disclose information about pharmacies as part of the safety exemption to 
public information laws.  
23. See, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, No. 14-1388, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3602, at 
*7 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014) (Bye, J., dissenting) (“Missouri has again, at 
the eleventh hour, amended its procedure and again is ‘using [a] shadow 
pharmac[y] hidden behind the hangman’s hood’ and ‘copycat 
pharmaceuticals’ to execute another death row inmate.”) (internal 
citations omitted); Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth 
Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 1367 (2014) (arguing that 
secrecy laws violate the due process that is implicit in the Eighth Amend-
ment); Nathanial A.W. Crider, Note, What You Don’t Know Will Kill 
You: A First Amendment Challenge to Lethal Injection Secrecy, 48 
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1 (2014) (arguing that secrecy laws violate 
a First Amendment public right of access to government information).  
24. See, e.g., Sells v. Livingston, 750 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2014); In re Lombardi, 
741 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2014); Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 
2013); Schad v. Brewer, No. CV-13-2001, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145387 
(D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2013); Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2014); Lockett 
v. Evans, 380 P.3d 488 (Okla. 2014). 
25. See, e.g., Hill, 758 S.E.2d at 800 (suggesting that Georgia’s secrecy law 
may be unconstitutional if applied to a case that came closer to meeting 
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This Comment is divided into three sections. Part I tells the story 
of Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws and further explains what the laws do. 
Part II examines a sampling of the constitutional challenges to state 
secrecy laws. Part III posits that the Supreme Court standards used by 
lower courts to uphold the laws are incompatible with the constitutional 
questions raised by the challenges. Part III ultimately concludes that 
the Supreme Court should intervene, both to slow the haphazard spread 
of the secrecy laws and to give lower courts (and states) guidance on 
the unique constitutional issues the laws present. 
I. The Story Behind Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws 
This Part is intended to provide the backstory of Lethal Injection 
Secrecy Laws while highlighting an analogy to Oklahoma’s process in 
creating the original protocols over thirty years ago. It also hints at a 
theory driving the focus of this Comment: when it comes to the death 
penalty, the states do not function as the “laboratories of democracy” 
that is the genius of our federal system.26 Instead, states act more like 
mechanics tasked with keeping the “machinery of death” operational.27  
In the face of mounting political pressure, pharmaceutical manu-
facturers have been refusing to provide states with some of the most 
common drugs used in lethal injection protocols. For example, in 2009, 
Hospira, Inc. ceased domestic production of sodium thiopental due to a 
material supply problem.28 For years, Hospira had been the sole supplier 
of the anesthetic, the first drug injected in multiple states’ three-drug  
the Eighth Amendment standard articulated in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 
(2008)); Lombardi, 741 F.3d at 896 (deciding the Eighth Amendment 
claim based on plaintiffs’ failure to show that the state had available 
alternative methods of execution, not based on the substance of whether 
secrecy laws might otherwise be unconstitutional); Sepulvado, 729 F.3d at 
417 (concluding that petitioner failed to meet the standard for injunction 
on his due process claim against Louisiana’s secrecy law without 
addressing the merits of a possible underlying Eighth Amendment claim). 
26. This popular phrase is derived from former Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents 
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
27. The phrase “machinery of death” comes from a well-known dissent from 
former Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, in which Blackmun 
wrote, “From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery 
of death.” Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (1994). The phrase also appears in the title of a book that equates 
capital punishment to a mechanical system. Machinery of Death: The 
Reality of America’s Death Penalty Regime (David R. Dow & 
Mark Dow eds., 2002).  
28. Denno, supra note 19, at 1360. 
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protocol.29 The company originally planned to continue production at 
a plant in Italy but faced pressure from increasingly tough export laws 
in Europe and threat of prosecution from Italian authorities.30 
Consequently, Hospira announced that it would no longer produce 
sodium thiopental.31 Although it was not necessarily identified as such 
at the time, this became a watershed moment for lethal injection 
protocols; it was the first sign that the thirty-year-old protocols might 
be failing.32  
As mentioned above, the European Union has implemented mea-
sures that regulate the export of drugs commonly associated with lethal 
injections, such as sodium thiopental and pentobarbital.33 These 
 
29. See Beaty v. FDA, 853 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining why 
some states began to search for overseas suppliers of thiopental). The 
incredible extent of those states’ desperation to find a new supplier of 
thiopental is illustrated by the fact that the FDA came down on the states 
for trying to import the anesthetic, “misbranded” and “unapproved,” from 
a company, Dream Pharma, that ran its business in the back of a driving 
school in London. See id. at 34; see also Bill Rankin, Georgia’s High Court 
to Take Look at Lethal-Injection Secrecy Law, ATLANTA J. 
CONSTITUTION (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.ajc.com/ 
 news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/georgias-high-court-to-take-look-
at-lethal-injecti/ndPSr/ (explaining that “[i]n 2011, Drug Enforcement 
Administration officials seized Georgia’s supply of sodium thiopental after 
lawyers for a condemned inmate accused the state of improperly 
importing the drug from England”).  
30. See Denno, supra note 19, at 1360–61 (noting that the Italian authorities 
were primarily concerned with “prevent[ing] the drug from ‘being diverted 
to departments of corrections for use in capital punishment procedures’”). 
31. Press Release, Hospira, Inc., Hospira Statement Regarding PentothalTM 
(Sodium Thiopental) Market Exit (Jan. 21, 2011), available at 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=175550&p=irol-newsArticl 
e_print&ID=1518610. (“Hospira announced today it will exit the sodium 
thiopental market and no longer attempt to resume production of its 
product, PentothalTM. Hospira had intended to produce Pentothal at its 
Italian plant. In the last month, we’ve had ongoing dialogue with the 
Italian authorities concerning the use of Pentothal in capital punishment 
procedures in the United States—a use Hospira has never condoned.”). 
32. See Denno, supra note 19, at 1361 (explaining that “[t]he shortage of 
sodium thiopental led prison officials to seek out questionable alternative 
sources of the drug throughout the world” and that “[s]uch practices 
raised concerns that prisoners may be injected with drugs that are impure, 
expired, unsafe, or ineffective”).  
33. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Comm’n Extends Control over 
Goods Which Could Be Used for Capital Punishment or Torture (Dec. 
20, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1578 
_en.pdf (“[T]rade of certain anaesthetics, such as sodium thiopental, 
which can be used in lethal injections, to countries that have not yet 
abolished the death penalty, will be tightly controlled.”); Kitamura & 
Narayan, supra note 20 (“[T]he European Commission amended its so-
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regulations are important to the story because some of the major 
producers of those drugs are based in Europe. Perhaps the most impor-
tant of these producers is a Danish pharmaceutical company, Lundbeck, 
Inc. Lundbeck has been a particularly critical cog in the states’ 
“machinery of death” because it is the only producer of injectable 
pentobarbital in the world.34 Pentobarbital is the most common drug 
in state lethal injection protocols; “[f]ourteen states have used pento-
barbital in executions”; five states have added pentobarbital to their 
protocols; and one state, Colorado, lists pentobarbital as a backup 
anesthetic.35 In January 2011, Lundbeck announced that it would no 
longer sell pentobarbital to states for use in executions and that it 
would forbid buyers from reselling it to states that would use it for 
lethal injection.36 
States subsequently scrambled to keep scheduled executions going. 
Ohio switched to a two-drug cocktail of midazolam (a sedative and 
anti-seizure drug) and hydromorphone (a painkiller derived from 
morphine) in time to execute Dennis McGuire in January 2014.37 De-
spite receiving a warning from at least one prominent anesthesiologist 
that the drugs would produce gasping for air and “a terrible, arduous, 
 
called Torture Goods Regulation . . . to impose export controls on 
pentobarbital as well as sodium thiopental.”).  
34. Lundbeck, the Sole Producer of Lethal Injection Drug, Announces It Is 
Blocking Supply to U.S. Execution Chambers, Death Penalty News 
(July 1, 2011), http://deathpenaltynews.blogspot.com/2011/07/lundbec 
k-sole-producer-of-lethal.html. 
35. State by State Lethal Injection, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last visited Mar. 
1, 2015).  
36. Press Release, H. Lundbeck A/S, Lundbeck Overhauls Pentobarbital 
Distribution Program to Restrict Misuse (Jan. 7, 2011), available at 
http://investor.lundbeck.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=605775. The 
American Pharmacists Association, following in the footsteps of the 
European Union and the ethical codes that doctors must agree to follow, 
recently issued a declaration that says that pharmacists should refuse to 
produce drugs for use in lethal injection cocktails. The declaration states 
as follows: “The American Pharmacists Association discourages pharma-
cist participation in executions on the basis that such activities are 
contrary to the role of pharmacists as providers of health care.” M. 
Spinnler, APhA House of Delegates Adopts Policy Discouraging 
Pharmacist Participation in Execution (Mar. 30, 2015), available at 
http://www.pharmacist.com/apha-house-delegates-adopts-policy-
discouraging-pharmacist-participation-execution.  
37. See Ed Pilkington, Ohio Executes Inmate Using Untried, Untested Lethal 
Injection Method, The Guardian, Jan. 16, 2014, http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/ohio-executes-inmate-untried-untes 
ted-lethal-injection-method (explaining that “Ohio’s recourse to the 
midazolam-hydromorphone combination was forced by a shortage of 
pentobarbital”). 
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tormenting execution,” Ohio proceeded with McGuire’s execution.38 
The execution lasted about twenty-five minutes, and McGuire 
“struggled, gasped, and choked for several minutes” before his death.39 
The botched execution prompted Ohio to announce that it would no 
longer use the two-drug mixture and (per court order) would suspend 
pending executions until it could develop protocols using pentobarbital 
or sodium thiopental.40 As a result, Ohio went back to the drawing 
board, unwilling to risk another botched execution but unable to obtain 
the anesthetics necessary for a single-drug protocol. 
Like Ohio, Oklahoma experimented with a new combination of 
drugs in response to the shortages. On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma 
injected Clayton Lockett with three drugs: midazolam, vecuronium 
bromide (a muscle relaxant), and potassium chloride (an anticonvulsant 
and sedative).41 This particular combination of drugs was administered 
in dosages that had never been used before in the United States.42 The 
experiment proved disastrous, as Lockett’s execution took forty-three 
minutes and caused Lockett to writhe and grunt; Lockett even sat up 
and said, “Man . . . something’s wrong.”43 A lawyer for another death 
row inmate equated Lockett’s execution to being “tortured to death.”44 
The event led a number of states to suspend executions, and President 
Obama subsequently called for a federal review of lethal injection 
protocols.45  
 
38. Ben Crair, Exclusive Emails Show Ohio’s Doubts About Lethal Injection, 
New Republic, Aug. 17, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/ 
119068/exclusive-emails-reveal-states-worries-about-problematic-executi 
on (revealing that the state received advanced warning from Dr. Mark 
Heath, an anesthesiologist at Columbia University).  
39. Mark Berman, The Recent History of States Scrambling to Keep Using 
Lethal Injections, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 2014, http://www.washington 
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/02/19/the-recent-history-of-states-
scrambling-to-keep-using-lethal-injections/. 
40. See Berman, supra note 20. 
41. Katie Fretland, Oklahoma Execution: Clayton Lockett Writhes on Gurney in 
Botched Procedure, The Guardian, Apr. 30, 2014, http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2014/apr/30/oklahoma-execution-botched-clayton-lockett. 
42. See id (noting that in employing a similar method, Florida has used five 
times the amount of midazolam). 
43. See Josh Levs et al., Oklahoma’s Botched Lethal Injection Marks New Front 
in Battle Over Executions, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/30/ 
us/oklahoma-botched-execution/ (last updated Sept. 8, 2014, 7:16 AM). 
44. Fretland, supra note 41.  
45. US President Obama Calls for Death Penalty Review, BBC News, May 
2, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-27265443. The dis-
astrous Lockett execution also led to criticism about the drug Midazolam, 
the subject of a lawsuit and stay of execution order granted by the 
Supreme Court in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015). 
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Critics and commentators have attributed these and other recent 
failures in lethal injection protocols to the haste with which the 
protocols were developed. Many have described the states’ collective 
approach as experimentation.46 This experimentation with various 
combinations of drugs have yielded poor results, with prisoners either 
experiencing pain or, at the very least, manifesting the appearance of 
pain by making sounds or gestures. As a result of these failures, states 
have largely retreated to the drugs that they know will (1) work and 
(2) bring less attention to their procedures. The tried-and-true 
execution drugs are the anesthetics, mostly pentobarbital and sodium 
thiopental.47 With the largest suppliers of anesthetics withholding their 
stock, states have struggled to find a sustainable supply. 
To solve this problem, states have turned to compounding 
pharmacies to make the drugs.48 This is unusual because compounding 
pharmacies normally operate in a niche market within the giant world 
of mass-produced pharmaceuticals. Generally speaking, compounding 
pharmacies do not produce drugs at all. Instead, they exist to alter 
drugs to fit the needs of particular patients.49 For example, if a patient 
is unable to take medicine that is mass-produced as a gelatin tablet, be 
it because the patient cannot take drugs orally or because the patient 
is allergic to a nonessential ingredient in the mass-produced version, a 
compounding pharmacy will combine the basic ingredients of the drug 
into a form that the patient can take without problem.50 Compounding 
pharmacies can thus produce the anesthetics that the states need for 
lethal injections by purchasing the raw chemical ingredients and 
combining them in state-regulated laboratories.  
Compounding pharmacies seem like a simple solution to the states’ 
drug problems. The issue, however, is a bit more complicated. First, 
because compounding pharmacies are not federally regulated, there is 
a significant amount of concern about the sterility of the drugs that 
 
46. See, e.g., Victor Li, Nationwide Lethal-Injection Drug Shortage Forces 
States to Experiment with Executions, ABA Journal, May 1, 2014, 
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/nationwide_lethal_injection
_drug_shortage_forces_states_to_experiment_with_. 
47. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 21–28 (arguing that the 
three-drug protocol subjects prisoners to unnecessary pain and that the 
best choice among poor choices is for states to stick to using lethal doses 
of anesthetics without additional drugs). 
48. See Fernandez, supra note 20 (noting that the states are responsible for 
overseeing and regulating compound pharmacies, not the FDA). 
49. See Compounding and the FDA: Questions and Answers, FDA, http:// 
www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Pharm
acyCompounding/ucm339764.htm (last updated Dec. 16, 2014). 
50. Id. 
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they compound.51 Second, compounding pharmacies object to the 
negative publicity associated with producing drugs that will be used to 
kill people—even people adjudged guilty of heinous crimes.52 Perhaps 
in order to induce compounding pharmacies to supply them with 
sodium thiopental or pentobarbital—or perhaps in order to protect 
their protocols from further criticism—states are becoming ever more 
discreet.  
Historically, states have sought to protect the identities of 
executioners, both for the sake of the executioners’ safety and psycho-
logical wellbeing.53 But with Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws, states have 
recently turned that narrow interest into something else entirely. Lethal 
Injection Secrecy Laws prohibit anyone from disclosing the identities of 
any person or business involved in the process of manufacturing, 
distributing, or administering lethal injection drugs. Often this blackout 
is enforceable by threat of civil action.54  
 
51. See Denno, supra note 19, at 1336–37 (noting a “disturbing trend” of 
compounding pharmacies selling large-scale batches of medicine without 
having to meet federal regulation standards, and, in essence, “act[ing] like 
large-scale pharmaceutical companies while hiding behind small-scale 
pharmacy licenses”). Professor Denno also cites a CDC report 
documenting an outbreak of fungal meningitis in Massachusetts that 
killed sixty-four people, which traced the outbreak back to a compounding 
pharmacy. Id. at 1337 (citing Multistate Outbreak of Fungal Meningitis 
and Other Infections—Case Count, Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/hai/out 
breaks/meningitis-map-large.html). 
52. See Tracy Connor, Missouri: We Found Another Pharmacy to Supply 
Execution Drugs, NBC News (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nbcnews. 
com/storyline/lethal-injection/missouri-we-found-another-pharmacy-sup 
ply-execution-drugs-n34226 (noting that some compounding pharmacies 
refused to sell anesthetics to Missouri because of concerns about the 
“negative publicity and legal hassles”). 
53. See Ellyde Roko, Executioner Identities: Toward Recognizing a Right to 
Know Who Is Hiding Beneath the Hood, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2791, 2796 
(“Although the method of execution has changed in the United States 
since the inception of capital punishment, each method has required an 
executioner. Generally, the stigma associated with the job of the 
executioner has made the position undesirable. Therefore, throughout 
history, the executioner has been hooded—both literally and figura-
tively.”). 
54. Sub. H.B. 663 § 2949.221(F), 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014) 
(“Any person, employee, former employee, or individual whose identity 
and participation in a specified activity is disclosed in violation of this 
division has a civil cause of action against any person who discloses the 
identity and participation in the activity in violation of this division. In 
a civil action brought under this division, the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover from the defendant actual damages, punitive or exemplary 
damages upon a showing of a willful violation of this division, and 
reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs.”). 
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Ohio’s secrecy law is illustrative of the secrecy laws in other states.55 
It can be broken down into three major parts.56 The first part prohibits 
disclosure of identifying information of all parties who participate in 
the process of manufacturing, distributing, and administering lethal 
injection drugs.57 The law justifies this policy on its face: confidentiality 
is imperative for the protection of all involved parties.58 The second 
part creates a civil cause of action against anyone who violates this 
prohibition.59 Lastly, part three forbids licensing boards from taking 
disciplinary action against physicians who oversee the lethal injection 
process.60  
Laws and policies that protect against the disclosure of certain 
information regarding the particulars of executions are relatively com-
mon.61 But Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws are worth closer analysis for 
two reasons. First, the scope of secrecy laws is much greater than 
necessary to serve the interest of protecting those directly involved in 
the execution process; secrecy laws make the entire lethal injection 
operation covert, a fact that raises constitutional questions that are the 
subject of Part II below. Second, Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws did not 
develop and evolve slowly over time, moving from state to state as the 
“laboratories of democracy” figured out how to solve a social problem.62 
Instead, most of the secrecy laws came out in a short window.63 This 
sort of desperation to keep the wheels of death row rolling is reminiscent 
of the way the original three-drug protocol was first instituted in 
Oklahoma. The three-drug protocol spread like wildfire into other 
states, which did little more than copy and paste Oklahoma’s protocols 
 
55. Cf. id. § 2949.221 (Ohio’s secrecy law); S.B. 36, 88th Leg. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (S.D. 2013) (South Dakota’s secrecy law); S.B 154, 108th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013) (Tennessee’s secrecy law). 
56  For an easy-to-read breakdown of H.B. 663, including the state interests 
that the law purports to further, see Dennis M. Papp, Bill Analysis: Am. 
H.B. 663, Ohio Legislative Serv. Comm’n, available at http:// 
www.lsc.ohio.gov/analyses130/h0663-ph-130.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).  
57. Sub. H.B. 663 § 2949.221(B), 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014). 
58. See id. § 2949.221. 
59. Id. § 2949.221(F). 
60. Id. § 2949.221(E). 
61. See John D. Bessler, Death in the Dark: Midnight Executions in 
America 151 (1997) (noting states with laws that explicitly protect 
executioners’ identities). 
62. See Berger, supra note 23, at 1380–81 (noting that states have been will-
ing to “take[] increasingly creative and legally dubious steps to procure 
drugs” ever since 2010, when Hospira first decided to stop selling to 
states). 
63. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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into their books.64 In contrast to those original protocols, however, 
secrecy laws make it almost impossible for the public to stay informed 
about lethal injection procedures.  
The following Part discusses the primary constitutional concern 
with secrecy laws. Specifically, Part II analyzes two approaches that 
lower federal courts have used to uphold secrecy laws in the face of 
constitutional challenges under the Eighth Amendment and the Due 
Process Clause. 
II. The Constitutional Concerns with Lethal 
Injection Secrecy Laws 
This Part describes the main constitutional problem with Lethal 
Injection Secrecy Laws: the laws violate a combination of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishment explicit in the Eighth Amendment. 
Secrecy laws generally preclude challengers from receiving any 
discovery from the state about the process of creating the drugs to be 
used in the forthcoming execution, including the credentials of all the 
people involved in this process.65 Thus, the central constitutional 
question amounts to this: how can a challenger show that his or her 
execution is likely to violate the Eighth Amendment without the ability 
to be informed of the credentials of those involved in the process of 
making and administering the drugs?66  
Courts and commentators have expressed diverging opinions about 
the interests of the states that the laws purport to protect.67 What has 
 
64. Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 34. 
65. See, e.g., Sub. H.B. 663 § 2949.221(B)(1)–(2), 130th Gen. Assemb. Reg. 
Sess. (Ohio 2014) (prohibiting disclosure “by any person, state agency, 
governmental entity, board, or commission or any political subdivision as 
a public record” or “by or during any judicial proceeding”). 
66. See, e.g., In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 2014) (inquiring 
whether the means of carrying out capital punishment violate the Eighth 
Amendment); Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(observing, but not ruling on, Sepulvado’s Eighth Amendment claims); 
Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E. 2d 794, 800 (Ga. 2014) (contemplating the 
potential existence of “a case in which the information shielded by the 
statute were the only essential missing link for the plaintiff in his or her 
proof of an Eighth Amendment claim”).  
67. Compare Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794, 805–06 (Ga. 2014) (identifying 
one particular state interest as the need to protect pharmaceutical 
companies and execution-procedure participants from harassment in order 
to ensure that people remain willing to participate in the procedures), 
with Editorial, Openness in Executions, 38 The News Media and the Law 
vol. 2 (2014) (noting generally the “public’s right to know . . . what’s 
being done in its name” in regards to lethal injection), available at 
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not been questioned, however, is arguably the most fundamental part 
of any constitutional analysis: the standard to be applied. Lower courts 
have uniformly relied on a substantive standard from the 2008 Supreme 
Court case Baze v. Rees68 to uphold secrecy laws in the face of 
petitioners’ Eighth Amendment and due process claims.69 The Baze 
standard makes it so that a petitioner must show that the execution 
procedure to which he will be subjected poses “‘a substantial risk of 
serious harm.’”70 Many courts apply an even more strenuous version of 
this standard, requiring petitioners to show the existence of “known 
and available alternatives” to the proffered method of execution in 
addition to the risk of serious harm.71 Regardless of whether a lower 
court applies the more strenuous test, petitioners cannot rely on 
speculation about the effect of protocols when they frame their 
challenges.  
Petitioners’ inability to rely on speculation is the keystone of most 
of the lower courts’ responses to the Eighth Amendment and due 
process arguments against secrecy laws.72 Because the secrecy laws 
prevent the petitioners from getting the information that they would 
need to make out a less-searching Eighth Amendment claim, the Baze 
standard basically functions as a total bar. And without their substan-
tive, underlying Eighth Amendment claim, petitioners have nothing on 
which to base their due process claims.  
The following subsections will provide two examples of how courts 
have used Baze to uphold state secrecy laws. Part II.A describes the 
case In re Lombardi,73 involving a discovery order issued by a district 
court mandating that the state reveal the identity of a compounding  
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/ 
news-media-and-law-spring-2014/openness-executions.  
68. 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
69. See, e.g., Hill, 758 S.E. 2d at 803 (finding that the death row inmate’s 
“factual assertions fall far short of satisfying the [Baze] legal standard”); 
Sepulvado, 729 F.3d. at 417 (finding that Louisiana’s one-drug protocol 
was a legal means of execution under the Baze standard). 
70. Id. at 50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)). 
71. See, e.g., In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 899–900 (8th Cir. 2014) (Bye, J., 
dissenting) (noting a disagreement regarding the scope of the Baze 
standard, specifically the available-alternatives prong). 
72. See, e.g., id. (issuing writ of mandamus preventing discovery of 
information covered by Missouri’s secrecy law on account of the inmate’s 
failed Eighth Amendment claim); Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794 at 803 (finding that 
speculative factual assertions regarding possible threats failed to support 
an injunction) (Ga. 2014); Wellons v. Commissioner, Ga. Dept. of 
Corrections, 754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court on 
the grounds that the inmate failed meet Eighth Amendment standard and 
so had no substantive grounds on which to base his due process claim). 
73. 741 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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pharmacy, and a subsequent successful petition to the Eighth Circuit 
for a writ of mandamus to prevent that order from going through. The 
Eighth Circuit held that the substantive Eighth Amendment claim 
underlying the discovery order could not meet the Baze standard and 
so could not be used to justify the discovery order.74 Part II.B looks at 
a case out of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Owens v. Hill.75 In Hill, 
the court took a notably different path to reach the same conclusion as 
the Eighth Circuit.  
A. In re Lombardi 
In In re Lombardi, an en banc panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals issued a writ of mandamus in favor of petitioner George 
Lombardi, Director of Missouri Department of Corrections.76 Lombardi 
requested the writ after a lower federal court entered a discovery order 
that would have forced Lombardi to reveal to the plaintiffs, a group of 
death row inmates, the identities of (1) the physician who prescribed 
the lethal injection drug (pentobarbital) to be used in the prisoners’ 
executions; (2) the pharmacist in charge of compounding the 
pentobarbital; and (3) the name of “the laboratory that tests the 
chemical for potency, purity, and sterility.”77 The writ of mandamus 
negated that discovery order.  
The plaintiffs had asserted that Missouri’s use of compounded 
pentobarbital was likely to produce “severe pain” in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.78 In contrast, Lombardi argued that Missouri law 
provided the state with an evidentiary privilege that protected the 
identities of the physician, the pharmacist, and the laboratory.79 In 
support, he contended that each of these entities was a member of the 
state’s “execution team” and therefore was covered under the privilege 
statute.80 According to the Director, Missouri had an interest in 
protecting their identities because compounding pharmacies might 
refuse to provide the state its supply of pentobarbital if the sale came 
at the risk of public disclosure of the pharmacy’s name.81 Stated another 
 
74. Id. at 896. 
75. 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2014).  
76. Id. at 889–90.  
77. Id. at 893. 
78. Id. at 895. 
79. Id. at 894.  
80. The term “execution team” was the state Department of Corrections’ 
designation of the group consisting of the physician who prescribed the 
drug, the pharmacist who compounded the drug, and the laboratory who 
tested the drug. Id. 
81. See id. (“[D]isclosure [of the name of the compounding pharmacy], [the 
Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections] contends, would 
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way, the state’s interest in protecting the identity of the compounding 
pharmacy was to keep the “machinery of death” up and running. 
The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that Missouri’s 
use of a compounding pharmacy was likely to create a substantial risk 
of severe pain “when compared to the known and available alterna-
tives.”82 In other words, the plaintiffs lost on their Eighth Amendment 
claim because they did not show that death by lethal injection of com-
pounded pentobarbital would be less humane than death by “lethal gas, 
electrocution, or firing squad.”83 And without the Eighth Amendment 
claim, the plaintiffs lacked an underlying basis for their due process 
claim. In effect, the court held that the plaintiffs should have lost on 
the merits of their substantive Eighth Amendment claim and so they 
were not entitled to a discovery order that infringed on important state 
interests; forcing the state to reveal that information could undercut 
the state’s ability to carry out their executions.  
The Eighth Circuit’s application of Baze is worth discussion for two 
reasons. First, the court’s interpretation of Baze is questionable; other 
circuits have held that plaintiffs cannot be forced to show “known and 
available” alternative methods of execution.84 Second (and more 
important), the court’s analysis is ignorant of its own circularity; how 
can a plaintiff possibly show that Missouri’s protocol “creates a 
substantial risk of severe pain” when the state withholds the 
information needed to make that claim? If states are free to keep this 
information a secret, then the Eighth Amendment is reduced to an 
after-the-fact method for the families of the executed person to recover; 
it does nothing to keep individuals free from “cruel and unusual 
punishments” at the hands of the states.  
B. Owens v. Hill 
Another prime example of the impossible circularity that the Baze 
standard creates for challengers is evident in Owens v. Hill. Unlike In 
re Lombardi, Hill involved a direct constitutional challenge to Georgia’s 
lethal injection secrecy law.85 And unlike the evidentiary privilege 
 
trigger collateral consequences that would prevent the Director from ob-
taining the lethal chemicals necessary to carry out the capital punishment 
laws of the State. He cites, as an example, a letter dated October 2013 
from a compounding pharmacy in Texas that demanded the Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice return a supply of compounded pento-
barbital sold for use in executions, because of a firestorm, including con-
stant inquiries from the press.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
82. Id. at 895–96. 
83. Id. at 895. 
84. See e.g., id. at 899–900 (Bye, J., dissenting) (noting the diverging ap-
proaches taken in other circuits).  
85. 758 S.E.2d 794, 796 (Ga. 2014).  
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asserted in Lombardi,86 Georgia’s secrecy law provides explicit 
protection for the names of the people and entities that take part in the 
state’s execution procedures, including the manufacturers of the lethal 
drugs.87 In other words, Hill centered on a direct constitutional 
challenge to a clear law, without any of the procedural peculiarities 
present in Lombardi.  
 In Hill, plaintiff Clarence Hill argued that Georgia’s secrecy law 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” in the Eighth 
Amendment by depriving him of the information needed to show that 
Georgia’s use of compounded lethal injection drugs gave rise to a 
substantial risk of severe pain.88 Hill won in the local superior court, 
which enjoined the state Department of Corrections from using its 
supply of compounded drugs to execute him.89 The local superior court 
was reversed on appeal. The Georgia Supreme Court held that Hill had 
“failed to show that obtaining the requested information would allow 
him to make a colorable [Eighth Amendment] claim [under Baze v. 
Reese].”90 The court reasoned that Hill’s concern about the potential 
lack of sterility of compounded drugs, as compared with those 
manufactured by an FDA-regulated producer, was meaningless in the 
context of his sentence.91 The court even mocked Hill’s expert witness 
on this point: “Particularly unpersuasive is Hill’s expert’s testimony 
that certain contaminants also could have the following effect: ‘Their 
blood pressure would drop precipitously, and ultimately it’s possible 
that they could die.’”92 The court went on to surmise that “[s]uch a side 
effect obviously would be shockingly undesirable in the practice of 
medicine, but it is certainly not a worry in an execution.”93 
The court spent little time on Hill’s arguments that the potency of 
the anesthetic might be too weak or that improper pH levels could cause 
 
86. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.  
87. See Ga. Code Ann. § 42-5-36(d)(2) (2014) (providing that “identifying 
information of any person or entity” participating in activities surround-
ing execution procedures “shall not be subject to disclosure” and “shall 
be classified as a confidential state secret”). 
88. See Hill, 758 S.E.2d at 801 (noting Hill’s argument “that he was denied 
identifying information about the manufacturer of his execution drug that 
might have allowed additional clarity to the claim”).  
89. See id. at 797 (noting that “[t]he Superior Court granted injunctive relief, 
which it described in various ways including as a stay of execution”). 
90. Id. at 804. 
91. See id. at 802 (holding that Hill’s claims alleged “symptoms that are 
irrelevant to a person being executed”). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
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severe pain. According to the court, “Hill’s expert gave no clear 
indication regarding the level of risk involved, and each of these possible 
complications appears to be unlikely to occur.”94 Because Hill’s claim 
was reduced to speculation about these potential problems, the court 
concluded that it did not meet the Baze standard for the Eighth 
Amendment.95 Because the claim failed under Baze, Hill was “not 
entitled to access to the courts.”96 The dissent in Hill points out the 
irony that the majority seems to miss:  
 
The majority reasons that Hill has not shown the statute 
to be unconstitutional under the present circumstances be-
cause his claims regarding the specific drug that the State will 
use to execute him are merely speculative. Admittedly, 
speculative claims regarding deficiencies in an execution drug 
are insufficient to sustain a claim of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. . . . However, the speculation permeating Hill’s claims 
arises solely from the State’s unwillingness, in light of the 
secrecy statute, to disclose information that would allow him 
to make more specific claims.97 
 
Unfortunately, the dissenting justices were unwilling to take their 
analysis further and identify the culprit for this confusing circularity: 
the Baze standard.  
The next Part follows through with the argument that the Baze 
standard is an inappropriate vehicle to use for analyzing the due process 
and Eighth Amendment challenges to secrecy laws. This is the case 
because Baze was not meant to tackle the due process element inherent 
in these challenges. Part III also sums up the argument that the states 
are not acting like “laboratories of democracy” when it comes to lethal 
injection protocols. For those reasons, this final Part concludes that the 
Supreme Court should intervene in order to (1) slow the train of 
botched executions that states have had in the last two years as they 
adopt new protocols and (2) provide lower courts with more appropriate 
standards for the challenges to secrecy laws. 
 
94. Id. 
95. See id. at 804 (finding that “Hill’s factual assertions fall far short of 
satisfying the legal standard applied under the Eighth Amendment, which 
involves a showing of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ that is ‘sure or 
very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering’”) (quoting Baze 
v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49–50 (2008)). 
96. Id. at 804 (quoting Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
97. Id. at 807 (Benham, J., dissenting). 
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III. A Brief Argument for 
Supreme Court Intervention 
On January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court denied Charles Warner’s 
petition for a stay of execution.98 In a dissent from the denial, Justice 
Sotomayor, joined by three other justices, reasoned that the Supreme 
Court should have granted the stay because of the convincing and ever-
growing body of science suggesting that midazolam is not effective as 
an anesthetic and thus should never be used as the first drug in a 
multiple-drug lethal injection cocktail.99 Midazolam certainly has been 
a problem-child drug for the states, but there is an underlying issue 
that Justice Sotomayor’s dissent largely ignores. Justice Sotomayor 
does, however, hint at this issue at the end of her dissent when she 
points to the “[s]tates’ increasing reliance on new and scientifically 
untested methods of execution.”100 
Ordinarily, when the Supreme Court denies a petition for a stay 
(or denies certiorari) on a novel question of law, it can rely on a 
laboratories-of-democracy argument.101 Even when a petition raises an 
important question of constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court 
can always let it play out in the states before it decides on the best 
solution. It is my contention in this Comment that this is not an 
appropriate issue on which to take such a laissez-faire approach. This 
is true for two reasons.  
First, the states are not acting as laboratories of democracy when 
it comes to developing execution protocols. “Democracy” implies 
democratic involvement, and in the case of execution protocols, there 
is little, if any, democratic involvement. This is true, in part, because 
states tend to leave discretion in the hands of state departments of 
 
98. See Warner v. Gross, 134 S. Ct. 824, 827–28 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). Consequently, Warner was subsequently executed, and wit-
nesses to the execution claimed that Warner said “[m]y body is on fire” 
as the lethal drugs entered his system. Dana Ford, Oklahoma Executes 
Charles Warner, CNN (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/ 
15/us/oklahoma-execution-charles-frederick-warner/. 
99. See Warner, 134 S. Ct. at 827 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (finding “evi-
dence suggesting that midazolam cannot constitutionally be used as the 
first drug in a three-drug lethal injection protocol”). The Supreme Court 
has, since Charles Warner’s botched execution, granted certiorari on this 
very issue and issued a stay of execution for those Oklahoma death row 
prisoners who were scheduled to be executed by a cocktail containing 
Midazolam. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015). 
100. Id. at 828.  
101. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting 
denial of certiorari) (“Often, a denial of certiorari on a novel issue will 
permit the state and federal courts to ‘serve as laboratories in which the 
issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court.’” (quoting 
McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983)). 
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correction. The state departments of correction then have a singular 
focus: continuing to execute prisoners. They do so however they can, 
many times just quickly copying the procedures of any state that suc-
ceeds in pulling one off.102 For example, states like Ohio, Georgia, and 
Oklahoma are turning to hasty experiments that are resulting in painful 
deaths.103 The spread of death penalty secrecy has proven to be much 
like the spread of the original three-drug protocols out of Oklahoma. 
The states are making an end-run around a problem (lack of drugs) by 
avoiding confrontation and turning to solutions (compounding 
pharmacies or new drugs) that are relatively unknown. If history is an 
accurate indication of what the future holds, states will likely stick with 
this formula for years to come—unless the Supreme Court intervenes.  
Second, the lower courts have been left to wrestle with how to apply 
Supreme Court standards that simply do not fit the constitutional 
questions raised by secrecy laws. The Baze standard for the Eighth 
Amendment simply is not tailored to handle challenges to laws that 
conceal information. The “substantial risk of serious harm” standard 
only allows courts to look one step down the road. It answers the 
question of how courts should respond to claims based on what might 
happen during an execution. It does not answer the question raised by 
Eighth Amendment challenges to secrecy laws, which is how courts 
should respond to claims based on prisoners not knowing—and not 
being able to find out—what might happen during an execution. In other 
words, it does not properly address a due process claim that is based 
on an underlying Eighth Amendment claim.  
Lower courts seem to recognize the circularity of the due process 
and Eighth Amendment problems, but most have sidestepped the issue 
by holding that the Eighth Amendment claim underlying the due 
process claim is not strong enough to trigger due process rights.104 
Courts dismiss the Eighth Amendment arguments as speculative, but 
it is the secrecy laws that cause the speculation.105 The conundrum, at 
its essence, is that the Baze standard does not address the due process 
element at all, making it an ill fit for challenges to secrecy laws. 
For the reasons outlined and briefly discussed in this Comment, the 
Supreme Court needs to intervene and give lower courts guidance on 
the constitutional issues relevant to Death Penalty Secrecy Laws. It is 
time that the lower courts stop trying to apply tests that do not fit the 
issues. Secrecy laws are new, but like the original lethal injection 
 
102. See supra note 18. 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 37–45. 
104. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. Other courts have side-
stepped the Eighth Amendment issue by holding that the due process 
claim is not strong enough to stand alone. See supra note 24 and accom-
panying text.  
105. See supra text accompanying note 97.  
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protocols developed over thirty years ago, they are spreading quickly. 
And given the states’ demonstrated unwillingness to scientifically test 
those original protocols, or alter the protocols in response to botched 
executions, it is probable that the secrecy laws will remain in place until 
another “broken electric chair” spurs change. Given the fundamental 
nature of the constitutional questions that these challenges to secrecy 
laws raise, the Supreme Court should speak up sooner rather than later. 
Harrison Blythe† 
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